

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

RID/

RI/AN

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
CSR/3/CA				
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CSR/3		25 JUN 1960		
6.				
SR/3-CA				
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8.	C/SR/3 RECORD			
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10.	SR/3/CA			
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14.	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3 B 2 D NAZ WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 104 DATE 2007			
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20.	RID/FI	14001		

475: This seems to be opinion derived from reading the traffic available both here and at 408.

This is the kind of thing you write when you're told to write something.

From 5: I do not believe KUBARK does not have the qualified personnel to assign to this to train, etc. AEQUANT I believe that on their own they will fall on their Red(Nose) skins. Ergo, I suggest that if the CA plant is no longer supportable, that we cut the ties, bearing in mind the always possible standfall opportunity.

Believe project renewal for one year warranted. While the views above probably justified, believe project can best exploited to spot + assess potential REDSKINS for direct KUBARK takeover if not for running via AECAMBISTA P.A.

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	X	FILE NUMBER
	INDEX		74-126-441
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
		2 June 60	EGOA-10172 lg-

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGOA-10172
TO INFO	Chief, SR MOB, EE	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 74-126-44/1	
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany	DATE 2 June 1960	
SUBJECT	O General - REDWOOD/AEQUOR Specific - Comments on Renewal of AEQUOR	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED	None	X	<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY			

REFERENCE(S)

- A. EGOW-11172, 13 November 1959
- B. EGOA-7830, 15 December 1959
- C. MUNI-7872, 24 December 1959
- D. MUNI-8654, 17 February 1960
- E. EGMA-48296, 1 April 1960
- F. MUNI-9620, 14 April 1960

1. Reference A requested field comments on the renewal of AEQUOR, and in Reference B we informed you that our comments would be withheld until MOB had had an opportunity to express their views. References C through F have clarified matters somewhat, and we now offer the following comments.

2. Although we are going to go along with the recommendation that AEQUOR be given one more year in which to prove itself, let us say at the outset that we agree with Munich's skepticism about the chances for success. The unavailability of good leadership and suitable operatives, plus the necessity of handling all operations through the emigre group, are not favorable circumstances. Another factor which automatically scales down the potential of AECAMBISTA REDSKIN activity is the limitation of targets. Relatively few Soviet Byelorussians are available at all, and the number of those who might be worthwhile targets is correspondingly low. As to the use of AECAMBISTAs against other than Byelorussians, we disagree with Reference E and feel that successful use of minority-group agents against Great Russian targets is made virtually impossible by the inbred aversion which has existed for centuries between the Great Russians and the nearby small nations they have so often dominated.

3. We do agree however, that AEQUOR shows enough potential to justify giving it one last opportunity to prove itself. We also feel that if the project is to be kept alive for at least one more year, more or less on a trial basis, it should be given enough support to determine whether it really can deliver. If it can show successes after a year's operation with a modest increase in support, it will have proven itself sufficiently to justify continued KUBARK support. If it shows no improvement, on the other hand, we will have grounds on which to terminate our subsidy.

4. As concerns priority of AEQUOR activities and allotment of support funds, we agree that the REDSKIN potential is the most important part of the project. We would nevertheless be in favor of a slight increase in the funds allotted for publication and distribution of the AEQUOR newspaper (if it is indeed "the only Byelorussian-language newspaper published by any anti-Soviet political entity," as stated in paragraph 2 of the attachment to Reference A) and other effective items in Byelorussian, with emphasis on insuring their quality and on getting them to internal (not emigre) Byelorussians. The radio segment of AEQUOR seems the least deserving of KUBARK support at the present time, since:

- a. It stands to be less effective than reading matter or personal contact.
- b. It is actually at the mercy of the Spanish authorities and could be shut off at a moment's notice.
- c. It is in the midst of re-organizing, and we do not yet know if it will be redirected along lines that we would wish to support.
- d. It has been run so far without KUBARK support.
- e. It represents a type of activity which (as you know) tends to be regarded by the KUCAGE Staff as an uneconomic expenditure of assets in all but the most demonstrably effective cases. This being the situation, too much emphasis on the radio angle could understandably prejudice acceptance of the whole thing.

5. We are accordingly in approximate agreement with the distribution of funds suggested by Headquarters in Reference A, i.e. that nothing be allotted for radio broadcasts and that the total subsidy be increased to [] to be divided [] between publishing activities and developmental REDSKIN

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respectively. We would suggest, however, that in allotting the latter funds the split be [] even [] or otherwise that the total subsidy be slightly increased) to permit a \$1,000-\$2,000 increase in the publications allotment. This would give them a chance to show how effective they can make their publication activities if they have a little more help, and at the same time would not seriously cramp the preliminary development of contact potential. Good-Quality non-inflammatory reading matter could, in fact, be a worthwhile aid in the development of contact operations.

*The usual
reduces the
yearly cost*

6. In regard to the \$32,000 death benefits which have been earmarked for a Byelorussian national-memorial center: We agree that if the center is to be built, Europe is a more fitting location than New York; but although we do not wish to seem unsympathetic toward Byelorussian emigre feelings, it seems that this respectable sum of money might better be spent in taking action against the Soviets than in building a memorial somewhere in the Free World. In this case, it seems unwise to spend \$32,000 on something so unproductive; the memorial will have little or no effect on Free World actions, nor is it needed to arouse anti-Soviet feelings in the Byelorussian emigration. It might be possible to suggest that the emigres spend this money in some way that would be productive in addition to satisfying their nationalistic feelings. For instance, they could invest it as a memorial fund, thereby providing a modest income to support anti-Soviet activities and at the same time honoring the memory of the fallen AECAMPOSANTOs in a much more worthwhile fashion; \$32,000, even if it were just put into a standard 4% interest savings account, would bring in over \$1,000 a year.

7. With regard to the Reference E statement that "operationally speaking, action directed against penetration of the USSR would appear to have more immediate promise," we wonder exactly what is envisioned. Contact operations have development of inside assets as their primary aim, of course; but the emphasis in Reference E seems to be on developing Byelorussian internal assets by sending AECAMBISTA agents into the target area, rather than by attempting to recruit Byelorussian travelers in the Free World. We disagree with this to the extent that we believe AECAMBISTA in its present condition is better able to conduct contact operations than to plunge into clandestine activity behind the Iron Curtain. With little personnel at their disposal, and with much of that personnel available only if and when no conflict with personal job responsibilities or status exists, there would be a much better possibility of getting and training agents for occasional brief contact missions in Western Europe than of getting and training agents to make clandestine trips to Byelorussian areas. We are not overlooking the subject of Reference F, and we are very interested in the outcome of his planned mission; but we feel in general that, barring special opportunities, AECAMBISTA would do much better to set their sights (at least initially) on something that appears more within their range.

8. Another statement in Reference E raises a question in our mind, the statement in paragraph 11 that "since they need not preserve a propaganda cover, the AECAMBISTAs in fact could even place emphasis on intelligence procurement." We think this would be unwise, because in so doing they might create more problems than if they were preserving a cover. If "openly" means with no attempt to conceal their aims, the AECAMBISTAs could scarcely be permitted by the local authorities (in whatever country they might be) to remain and overtly carry on provocative activities. If "openly" is intended to mean that the AECAMBISTAs would only admit their objective to Soviet Byelorussian contacts, such an approach would still probably scare off the contacts and possibly also create serious flaps.

9. We look forward with interest to receiving final Headquarters resolution of the renewal of AEQUOR.

APPROVED: []

Dist: 2-SR, MOB, EE.